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Abstract 
We offer a novel contribution by examining the impact of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) disclosure quantity and quality on firm value. We use a sample of 171 
non-financial firms listed in the Saudi stock market for the period 2013-2014. We complement 
and extend the work of Hasseldine, Salama and Toms (2005) by measuring the quantity and 
quality of CSR disclosure and examining their impact on firm value. To measure CSR 
disclosure quality, we following Beest el al (2009) and capture all qualitative attributes of 
information quality as defined in the conceptual framework of the IASB (2010 a). We use a 
CSR disclosure index to measure the quantity of disclosure.  
Our analysis shows a positive association between CSR disclosure quality and quantity 
and market capitalisation. However, we did not find the same results when we use either 
Tobin’s Q or Return on Assets (ROA) as proxies for firm value. This suggests that both CSR 
disclosure quantity and quality have the same impact on firm value. However, the significance 
of this impact depends on whether the authors use market capitalisation, Tobin’s Q or ROA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Disclosure Quantity versus Quality; Firm Value; 
Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
1- INTRODUCTION  
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure quantity and quality have attracted 
major interest in accounting literature since the publication of a remarkable paper by 
Hasseldine, Salama and Toms (2005). Using a subjective measure of environmental disclosure 
quality, Hasseldine et al (2005:231) offer the first empirical evidence that the “quality of 
environmental disclosure rather than mere quantity has a stronger effect on the creation of 
environmental reputation amongst executive and investor stakeholder groups. They suggest 
that further investigation on the impact of CSR disclosure strategy and stock market value 
could be extremely useful in understanding the relevance of CSR disclosure quantity and 
quality. Our study aims to examine this important research issue. 
In a recent study, Zahller, Arnold and Roberts (2015:155) provide evidence that “when 
CSR disclosures are higher quality, investors perceive organizational legitimacy to be higher, 
inferring that organizations should emphasize quantifiable, consistent, and comparable 
reporting”. This implies that “high-quality voluntary CSR disclosure can help protect 
organizational financial market performance following an exogenous shock through the 
disclosure’s effect on perceived legitimacy” (Zahller et al, 2015:174). Therefore, we expect 
that CSR quality should have a positive impact on firm value. 
Zahller, et al (2015:174) consider two characteristics of information quality (the 
accuracy and completeness of CSR information) when measuring the quality of CSR disclosure. 
They suggest further research to consider “the factors producing high-quality voluntary CSR 
disclosures to understand how information characteristics interact with cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral user characteristics in affecting organizational performance. Our study is a 
response to Hasseldine et al (2005:231) and Zahller, et al (2015). We following Beest el al 
(2009) and capture all qualitative characteristics of information quality as defined in the 
conceptual framework of the IASB (2010). We use a CSR disclosure index to measure the 
quantity of disclosure. We then examine the impact of CSR quantity and quality on firm value 
in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia provides a unique country context in which to analyse the impact 
of CSR disclosure quantity and quality on firm value because of its emerging economy with 
different religious, social and political systems and traditions. Daily life, business, law, 
economics and political aspects of the Saudi society are affected by Islamic principles. In 
addition, the country improved its corporate governance (CG) code in 2010. This strengthened 
CG code requires companies to disclose their CSR activities in their annual reports. Moreover, 
the code is affected by Islamic principles that have paved the way for the introduction of Islamic 
governance characteristics (Albassam, 2014), and this is bound to affect the CSR disclosure of 
Saudi Arabian companies. 
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The impact of CSR disclosure on firm values of Saudi Arabian companies has not been 
thoroughly documented, although there are some studies that have investigated CSR in Saudi 
Arabia (e.g.Habbash and Ibrahim, 2015; Mandurah et al., 2012). Furthermore, Nalband et al. 
(2013) observed CSR perceptions, practices and performance of listed companies in Saudi 
Arabia. Our study offers two major contributions. First, we offer a new measure for CSR 
disclosure quality for one of the developing countries, Saudi Arabia. Second, we are the first 
to examine the impact of the quantity and quality of CSR disclosure on firm values in Saudi 
Arabia.  
We find a positive relationship between CSR disclosure quality/ quantity and market 
capitalisation. However, we did not find the same observation when we use either Tobin’s Q 
or Return on Assets (ROA) as proxies for firm value. This suggests that both CSR disclosure 
quantity and quality have the same impact on firm value. However, the significance of this 
impact depends on whether the authors use market capitalisation, Tobin’s Q or ROA.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses theories, 
Section 3 reviews the literature, Section 4 explains the research design, Section 5 reports the 
results and Section 6 concludes the research.  
2. THEORIES  
There are many theories that explain the relationship between CSR disclosure and the 
value of a company. We use the signalling and agency theories and the efficient market 
hypotheses to explain the relationship between these variables. 
2.1. Signalling and Agency Theories 
Prior research shows that a company’s voluntary disclosure impacts its value based on 
signalling theory (Sheu et al., 2010). The use of signalling theory explains why companies 
disclose CSR information to their stakeholders (Uyar et al., 2012). It is argued that voluntary 
disclosures in the annual report send signals to the marketplace that are expected to increase a 
company’s net present value and consequently its stock market value (Gordon et al., 2010). In 
addition, prior research (i.e. Sheu et al. 2010) shows that disclosure reduces the information 
asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (stakeholders) and hence reduced 
agency conflicts between both parties. This leads to an increase in firm value (Sheu et al. 2010). 
 
 
2.2. Efficient Market Hypotheses (EMH) 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, CSR information is expected to be of 
increased benefit to investors as this information may lead to positive or negative adjustments 
in company security prices, thus affecting the value of a company (Jensen, 1978).  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A limited number of studies examine the impact of disclosure on firm value (Uyar et 
al., 2012). However, the results are mixed. For example, Hassan et al. (2009) find that 
mandatory disclosure has a negative relationship with firm value while voluntary disclosure 
has no impact on firm value. Da-Silva and Alves (2004); Sheu et al. (2010), Gordon et al. 
(2010);; Curado et al. (2011) and Uyar and Kiliç (2012)  find that voluntary disclosure impacts 
firm value. In a recent paper, Elzahar et al. (2015) find a weak positive relationship between 
KPIs disclosure and firm value. Uyar and Kiliç (2012) noted that the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and a company’s value depends on the measure of a company’s value (e.g., 
market to book value and market capitalisation).  
Limited literature examines the value relevance of CSR disclosure. Cho, Lee, and Pfeiffer 
(2013) investigated the relationship between CSR performance and information asymmetry. They 
found that CSR performance is inversely related to information asymmetry. The association, 
however, can be found only in companies that have less institutional investors, implying that fully 
informed investors are bound to act upon information relating to CSR performance. Richardson 
et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between social disclosure and cost of equity capital. 
They found a positive association between social disclosure and cost of equity capital. Hussainey 
and Salama (2010) also provide evidence that higher levels of corporate environmental reporting 
scores improve investors’ ability to anticipate future earnings.  Ulmann (1985) argued that firms 
use social disclosures in order to manage relationships with their stakeholders. He suggested that 
social disclosure is a function of three dimensions: stakeholders’ power, strategic posture and 
economic performance. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) found that firms that report non-financial social 
responsibility information are more likely to raise larger amounts of equity capital in the two years 
following the reporting, compared with non-reporting firms. From a signaling perspective, 
managers seeking finance assistance may wish to send good signals to the investors and debt 
holders. For investors, such communication is credible because managers making fraudulent 
signals will be penalized (Hughes, 1986). This suggests that firm value might be lowered due to 
investors’ negative expectations with regard to the financial consequences of social and 
environmental aspects. Hasseldine et al.(2005) investigate the association between corporate 
environmental disclosure and corporate environmental performance measured by the 
environmental reputation. They find the quality of environmental disclosure more impact than the 
quantity of disclosure on the environmental reputation. Elliot et al. (2014) they find that 
association between CSR performance and investors’ estimates of fundamental value that can be 
diminished by investors’ explicit valuation of CSR performance.  
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior research on the impact of CSR disclosure 
quantity and quality on firm value (Habbash, and Ibrahim. 2015; Mondarah, et al. 2012), 
particularly in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this study attempts to investigate this issue. Based on the 
above discussion and because of the mixed findings, we hypothesise that: 
H1: There is an association between the quantity of CSR disclosure and firm value in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
Agency and signalling theories suggested that disclosure quality should help in 
correcting any firm mis-valuation. Both theories argued that disclosure quality should help in 
in reducing asymmetric information among the stock market participants, as well as between 
managers and investors. Therefore, firm value should be increasing as a result of disclosure 
quality through either reducing its cost of capital or increasing the cash flow to its shareholders 
or both (Elzahar et al, 2015). Prior research argues that there is little evidence on this research 
stream to deduct a cohesive conclusion on the relationship between disclosure quality and firm 
value (Hassan et al, 2009).  In addition, Beattie et al. (2004: 233) argue that: “Researchers 
investigating the determinants and consequences of disclosure quality could be wasting their 
effort if the primary variable of interest Disclosure is not being measured with a sufficient 
degree of accuracy”. Also, Beyer et al. (2010:311) review prior research different proxies for 
disclosure quality and conclude that:  “a sensible economic definition of voluntary disclosure/ 
financial reporting quality and direct derivation of measures from that definition is missing 
from the literature. This lack of an underlying economic definition hinders our ability to draw 
inferences from this work, and we recommend that future research address this issue”. In the 
CSR literature, Hasseldine et al (2005:231) showed that the quality (not the quantity) is more 
information for UK companies’ reputation. Zahller, Arnold and Roberts (2015) showed that 
investors perceived organizational legitimacy to be higher for companies with higher levels of 
CSR disclosure quality. Hence, we expect that CSR disclosure quality should positively affect 
firm value. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between the quality of CSR disclosure and firm value in 
Saudi Arabia. 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN  
4.1.  Sample   
The current study uses a sample of Annual Reports of Saudi Arabian non-financial 
companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange over the period of 2013-2014. The period 
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chosen because it is close to the declaration of the Saudi governance code that included social 
contributions. In addition, the study is based on the most recent company Annual Reports that 
contain CSR disclosure. Moreover, non-financial companies are more likely to be utilised for 
their social and environmental impact, which can have a major influence on a company’s 
reputation (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). 
The total number of non-financial companies listed in Saudi Stock Exchange for years 
2013-2014 is 198. Following prior research (i.e. Hussainey and Salama, 2010), financial firms 
were excluded. In addition, companies with missing financial data and firms have been 
suspensions were excluded, this leaving a sample of 171 companies for both years. Table 1 
shows the final sample sorted by industries. 
  
Table 1: Industry Classification  
Industry  N % 
Basic material  28 16.4% 
Consumer goods  27 15.8% 
Consumer services  35 20.5% 
Industrials 66 38.6% 
Real Estate  4 2.3% 
Telecommunication  7 4.1% 
Utilities  4 2.3% 
Total  171 100% 
This Table provides the distribution of industries of the sample. The definitions of the 
industries are based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
 
Annual Reports were collected from the official websites of companies. Governance 
data was manually collected from the companies’ Annual Reports. All financial data is 
collected from Datastream. The table 2 shows Datastream codes for the financial data.  
 
 
Table 2: Datastream Variables Definitions  
Variable Measurement 
Leverage   The ratio of total debt to total capital (WC 08221)  
Liquidity  Current ratio (WC 08106)  
Cash dividends paid  Total dividends paid to common shareholders (WC 04551) 
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Asset growth  Total assets growth (WC 08621) 
Capital expenditure 
assets 
Capital expenditures as percentage of total assets (WC 08416) 
 
4.2.  Measuring the Quantity and Quality of CSR Disclosure  
This study develops two disclosure indices: one to measure the level of CSR disclosure 
quantity, and the other to measure CSR disclosure quality. The index for CSR disclosure 
quantity is based on prior research (e.g., Ng, 1995; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Hall, 2002; 
Newson & Deegan, 2002). This index consists of seven disclosure categories: (1) employees, 
(2) communities, (3) environmental issues, (4) products and services, (5) energy, (6) customers 
and (7) other disclosure items which are consistent and compatible with the Saudi Arabia 
culture and its economic environment. Appendix 1 details the disclosure index for CSR 
disclosure quantity. In determining the CSR disclosure quantity, an unweighted disclosure is 
commonly utilised. This approach has been adopted by several researchers in which an item 
scores one if it is disclosed and zero if it is not disclosed (Abdurouf, 2011; Haji, 2013; Aribi 
and Gao, 2010; Anwar et al., 2010).  
Following prior research (e.g., Botosan, 2004; Jonas and Blanchet, 2000; Beest et al., 
2009; Chakroun et al. 2014), this study develops a disclosure index to measure the level of 
CSR quality based on the qualitative characteristics of accounting information suggested in the 
conceptual frameworks of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (2010A). 
This allows for the evaluation of the qualitative characteristics of financial information by 
weighted measure as provided in earlier studies (Beest et al., 2009; Chakroun & Hussainey, 
2014).  The study adopted the four qualitative characteristics of CSR information: “relevance,” 
“faithful representation,” “understandability” and “comparability 1 ” to assess the CSR 
disclosure quality in Annual Reports. The reliability and validity of our disclosure scores are 
checked by comparing the correlation between the scores produced by the first author with 
those produced by the second author for a sample of annual reports.  
 
Measuring Firm Value  
This study used three measurements of firm value. These are Tobin’s Q ratio, market 
capitalization and return on assets (ROA). Although there is no agreement in the literature 
                                                          
1 Definition of each characteristic is included in Appendix 2. 
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about an ideal measure for firm value (Mangena et al., 2012; Albassam, 2014), these measures 
are used extensively in prior studies. The standardization of this type of measure would be 
helpful to develop comparability with other studies (Munisi and Randoy, 2013).    
Our first measure of firm value is the natural logarithm of a company’s Tobin’s Q ratio 
at the end of the fiscal year. Tobin’s Q = [(total debt + market value of equity) / book value of 
total assets]. The second measure is the market capitalization (Uyar and Kilic, 2012). Market 
capitalization is measured as the market value of common equity at the end of a company’s 
year of operations. The third measure is the return on assets (ROA) that determines a 
company’s net income in relation to its total assets.  
5. REGRESSION MODEL 
To test the hypotheses (H1, H2), we control for corporate governance variables and 
firm characteristics. In particular, we consider the following variables: Board size, independent 
directors, governmental ownership, managerial ownership, CEO duality, frequency of Board 
meetings, audit committee size, remuneration committee size, liquidity, leverage, dividends, 
asset growth and capital expenditure. In addition, the year and industry fixed effects were also 
included to control for the year and industry effect. Equation 1 examines the value relevance 
of CSR disclosure quantity while equation 2 examines the value relevance of CSR disclosure 
quality.  
Firm value = β0+β1 CSR Quan + β2BSIZE+β3 INDTO+β4 GOVWN +β5 MANOW +β6 
CEOD +β7 BMET + β8 ACZISE +β9 REMCOSZE + β10 LIQ + β11 LEV+ β12 DIVI + β13 
ASTGTH + β14 CAPEXAST + Year Fixed Effect + Industry Fixed Effect                                                                                     
(1)                                                                                                                                                                   
Firm value = β0+β1 CSR Qual + β2BSIZE+β3 INDTO+β4 GOVWN +β5 MANOW +β6 
CEOD +β7 BMET + β8 ACZISE +β9 REMCOSZE + β10 LIQ + β11 LEV+ β12 DIVI + β13 
ASTGTH + β14 CAPEXAST + Year Fixed Effect + Industry Fixed Effect                                                                                    
(2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Where 
Firm value is measured by TQ, ROA and MC; CSR Quan refers to the quantity of CSR 
disclosure; CSR Qual is the quality of CSR disclosure; BSZE is the total number of directors 
on the Board; INDTO is the number of independent directors on the Board; GOVWN is the 
percentage of shares owned by government; MANOW is the aggregate percentage of shares 
held by major shareholders (with at least 3% ownership); CEOD is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the chairman of the Board is the same person as the CEO of the firm, otherwise it is 0; 
10 
 
BMET is the total number of Board meetings during the year; ACSZE is the total number of 
directors on the audit committee; REMCOSZE is the number of members of the firm 
remuneration committee; LIQ is firm liquidity measured using the current ratio (current assets 
/ current liabilities); LEV is firm leverage measured using the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets; DIVI is the total dividends paid to common shareholders; ASTGTH is firm asset 
growth ratio; CAPEXAST is capital expenditure assets measured as capital expenditures as a 
percentage of total assets.  
5.1 Results  
    5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of CSR disclosure quantity and quality on firm 
value. The mean value of CSR disclosure quantity and quality is 9.433 and 0.334, respectively, 
which reveals that the value of CSR disclosure quantity in Saudi Arabian firms is higher than 
the value of CSR disclosure quality. In addition, the minimum and maximum values of CSR 
disclosure quantity range from 0.000 to 51.00. However, the minimum and maximum values 
of CSR disclosure quality range from 1.00 to 1.3. 
Furthermore, this study uses three measurements (TQ, ROA and MC) to examine the 
impact of CSR disclosure on value in Saudi Arabia firms. As result, the mean value of LogTQ 
is 0.6647 and the minimum and maximum are 0.038 and 2.194, respectively. Moreover, the 
mean value of ROA is 8.976, the maximum is 36.530 and the minimum is -15.41. The mean 
value of MC is 15.040, whereas the minimum and maximum values are 12.88 and 19.628, 
respectively.  
In terms of governance mechanisms, the mean value of Board size (BSZE) is 8.485 
with a minimum value of 4.0 and maximum value of 12.0. This means that the Board size of 
Saudi Arabian firms ranges from 4-12 members. The mean value of the percentage of 
independent directors (INDTOR) in the Board is 4.064 with a minimum value of 0.00 and a 
maximum value of 11.0. In terms of ownership structure, the mean value of governmental 
ownership (GOVWN) is 0.032 and minimum and maximum values are 0.000 and 0.743, 
respectively. In addition, the mean value of managerial ownership (MANOWR) is 0.055 and 
the minimum is 0.000 and the maximum is 0.700. The mean value of the role duality of CEO 
(CEOD) is 0.357 with a minimum value of 0.000 and a maximum value of 1.0. The mean value 
of Board meetings (BMET) is 5.292; whereas, the minimum value is 0.000, and the maximum 
value is 16.0. The audit committee size (ACSZE) of Saudi Arabian firms has a mean value of 
3.316 and its minimum value is 0.000 and its maximum value is 6.0. Furthermore, the mean 
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value of remuneration committee size (REMUCOSZE) is 3.368 and the minimum value is 
0.000 and the maximum value is 7.0.  
With regard to firm characteristics, the mean value of firm liquidity (LIQ) is 1.39 and 
the minimum and maximum values are 0.070 and 5.770, respectively. The mean value of firm 
leverage (LEV) is 57.96 with a minimum value of 0.000 and a maximum value of 354.910. 
Furthermore, the dividends paid (DIVI) have a mean value of 493,507 and the minimum and 
maximum of 0.000 and 18,502,401, respectively. In addition, asset growth (ASTGTH) has a 
mean value of 8.736 and the minimum and maximum values of -28.730 and 75.120, 
respectively. Finally, the mean value of capital expenditure assets (CAPEXAST) is 7.558 and 
the minimum value is 0.000 and the maximum value is 56.950.  
 
Table 2 : sample descriptive statistics  
 N Mean Std Dev. Minimu
m 
25% Medium 
(50%) 
75% Maximum  
Log TQ 171 .6647 .4891 .038 .260 .582 .926 2.194 
Log Capitalization 171 15.040 1.3786 12.88 14.036 14.694 15.977 19.628 
Return assets 171 8.976 9.064 -15.41 3.480 7.810 12.580 36.530 
CSR quant 171 9.433 9.517 .000 2.000 6.000 15.000 51.0 
CSR qual 171 .334 .1417 .100 .2000 .325 .425 1.300 
BSZE 171 8.485 1.606 4.00 7.000 9.000 9.000 12.0 
INDTOR 171 4.064 1.587 .000 3.000 4.000 5.000 11.0 
GOVWN 171 .0325 .1347 .000 .000 .000 .000 .7431 
MANOWR 171 .0557 .1264 .000 .000 .000 .0450 .7000 
CEOD 171 .357 .4804 .000 .000 .000 1.000 1.0 
BMET 171 5.292 2.3230 .000 4.000 5.000 6.000 16.0 
ACSZE 171 3.316 .9297 .000 3.000 3.000 4.000 6.0 
REMUCOSZE 171 3.368 1.0677 0.000 3.000 3.000 4.000 7.0 
LIQ 171 1.393 1.275 .0700 .480 .960 1.770 5.770 
LEV 171 57.961 67.515 .000 8.200 32.760 87.490 354.910 
DIVI 171 493507 1858755 0.000 23.000 65000 306000 18502401 
ASTGTH 171 8.736 13.750 -28.730 .000 6.200 14.550 75.120 
CAPEXAST 171 7.558 8.760 .000 1.470 4.630 11.090 56.950 
Firm value measured by TQ, ROA and MC; CSRQuan refers to the quantity of CSR disclosure; CSRQual is the 
quality of CSR disclosure; BSZE is the total number of directors on board; INDTO number of independent directors 
in the firm board of directors, GOVWN Percentage of shares owned by government, MANOW is the aggregate 
percentage of shares hold by major shareholders (with at least 3% ownership), CEOD  A dummy variable equals 1 
if the chairman is the same person as the CEO of the firm,0 otherwise  BMET is the total number of board meetings 
during the year; ACSZE is the is the total number of directors in audit committee;, , REMCOSZE Number of 
members of the  firm remuneration committee, LIQ is firm liquidity, measured using the current ratio (current 
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assets / current liabilities); LEV is firm leverage, measured using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, DIVI 
Total dividends paid to common shareholders. ASTGTH is firm Assets growth ratio, CAPEXAST is capital 
expenditures assets, measured by Capital expenditures as percentage of total assets. 
***, **, * indicate significance at .001, .05 & .1 level. 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of CSR disclosure quantity and quality, in addition to explanatory 
variables.  
 
5.1.2 Correlation Analysis  
Gujarati and Porter (2009) show that variables have high correlation if the correlation 
is higher than 0.80, and thus conclude that multi-collinearity among variables is acceptable if 
the correlation coefficients are less than 0.80. Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation. It shows 
that correlations are relatively low (less than 0.80) among all variables which indicate that there 
is no multi-collinearity problem.   
An additional check for multi–collinearity was performed by calculating the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) after each regression model. Earlier research has stipulated that if the 
VIF value is more than 10, then there is certain to be a multi-collinearity problem. The mean 
and maximum values of the VIF investigations were formulated with the regression results to 
show that there is no need to be concerned with this problem (Field, 2009).    
Table 3 shows that CSR disclosure quantity is positively correlated with market 
capitalization at 0.371 (5% significance level). However, there is no correlation between CSR 
disclosure quantity and the other measurements. It provides evidence that CSR disclosure 
quantity is statistically correlated positively with some corporate governance variables such as 
BSZE at 0.182 (10% significance level), CEO duality at 0.191 (10% significance level), 
ACSZE at 0.173 (10% significance level), and correlated positively and negatively with firm 
characteristics, such as dividends paid at 0.287 (5% significance level) and CAPEXAST at -
0.187 (10% significance level).  
In addition, the CSR disclosure quality is associated positively with market 
capitalization at 0.305 (5% significance level). However, there is no correlation with the two 
other measurements. Table 3 shows that it is correlated with one variable of corporate 
governance, such as managerial ownership at 0.199 (5% significance level), and with firm 
characteristics, such as dividends paid at 0.338 (5% significance level).  
Moreover, the Pearson correlation matrix indicates a significant association between 
CSR disclosure quantity and quality with some firm characteristic variables. This study finds 
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that there is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure quantity and quality and both are 
significantly correlated with dividends paid at 0.287 and 0.338, respectively (5% significance 
level). 
This result is consistent with prior research, such as Elliott, Jackson, Peecher and White 
(2014), who show that CSR disclosure is negatively associated with firm value. According to 
Klein et al. (2005), firm value rises with greater corporate governance disclosure, thus we 
suppose that voluntary disclosure has a positive impact on the firm value. Previous studies 
(Sheu et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2010) pointed out that voluntary disclosure has an impact on 
firm value based on the signalling theory. Consequently, more disclosure signals give a better 
governance mechanism and reduce agency conflicts. 
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Table 3 : Pearson Correlation Matrix  
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CSR Quan 
1 0.668** 0.037 0.371** 0.118 0.182* 0.001 0.079 0.021 0.191* 0.063 0.173* 0.000 -0.008 -0.095 0.287*
* 
-0.048 -0.187* 
 0.000 0.630 0.000 0.123 0.017 0.991 0.301 0.788 0.012 0.414 0.024 0.996 0.914 0.216 0.000 0.536 0.014 
CSR Qual 
 1 0.054 0.305** 0.024 0.092 -0.098 0.096 0.199
** 
0.108 -0.029 0.142 0.071 0.036 -0.080 0.338*
* 
0.054 -0.127 
  0.486 0.000 0.756 0.232 0.203 0.209 0.009 0.159 0.704 0.064 0.357 0.639 0.296 0.000 0.481 0.097 
Log TQ 
  1 0.009 0.553
** 
-0.148 -0.065 -0.105 0.210
** 
0.095 -0.040 -0.047 0.031 0.195*
* 
-0.522** -0.015 0.145 0.245** 
   0.910 0.000 0.053 0.401 0.172 0.006 0.214 0.606 0.540 0.684 0.011 0.000 0.851 0.058 0.001 
Log 
Capitalizati
on 
   1 0.284
** 
0.371*
* 
-0.099 0.426** 0.026 0.116 0.177* 0.304*
* 
0.272*
* 
0.030 0.183 0.562 -0.014 -0.016 
    0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.734 0.131 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.694 0.017 0.000 0.854 0.831 
ROA 
    1 0.157* 0.060 -0.165* 0.130 0.173* 0.010 -0.016 0.089 0.271*
* 
-0.362** 0.114 0.109 0.197** 
     0.041 0.438 0.031 0.089 0.023 0.897 0.840 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.137 0.157 0.010 
BSZE 
     1 0.352*
* 
0.089 -0.020 0.049 0.047 0.165* 0.286*
* 
-0.004 0.081 0.088 0.004 -0.129 
      0.000 0.245 0.798 0.527 0.543 0.031 0.000 0.956 0.291 0.253 0.960 0.093 
INDTO 
      1 -0.099 0.049 -0.038 0.011 0.062 -0.018 0.046 -0.074 -0.087 -0.054 -0.164* 
       0.200 0.525 0.622 0.888 0.421 0.820 0.546 0.339 0.257 0.481 0.032 
GOVWN 
       1 -0.107 -0.022 0.119 0.278*
* 
0.254*
* 
-0.030 0.226** 0.495*
* 
-0.035 0.012 
        0.163 0.771 0.122 0.000 0.001 0.701 0.003 0.000 0.647 0.873 
MANOW  
       1 -0.050 -0.155* -0.098 -0.089 -0.064 -0.069 -0.070 0.245*
* 
0.142 
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         0.514 0.043 0.202 0.246 0.408 0.369 0.365 0.001 0.065 
CEOD 
         1 -0.073 0.062 -0.017 -0.033 -0.147 0.177* 0.044 -0.135 
          0.343 0.418 0.826 0.670 0.055 0.021 0.563 0.077 
BMET 
          1 0.172* 0.189* -0.113 -0.073 0.158* -0.203* 0.033 
           0.024 0.013 0.143 0.346 0.040 0.008 0.669 
ACSZE 
           1 0.635*
* 
0.001 0.121 0.216*
* 
-
0.236** 
-0.133 
            0.000 0.986 0.116 0.004 0.002 0.082 
REMCOSZ
E 
            1 -0.021 0.090 0.249*
* 
-0.166* -0.049 
             0.786 0.241 0.001 0.030 0.526 
LIQ 
             1 -0.301* 0.122 0.009 -0.143 
              0.000 0.111 0.906 0.063 
LEV 
              1 -0.060 -0.069 -0.129 
               0.437 0.373 0.094 
DIVI 
               1 -0.114 -0.042 
                0.138 0.584 
ASTGTH 
                1 0.339** 
                 0.000 
CAPEXAS
T 
                 1 
                  
Firm value measured by TQ, ROA and MC; CSR Quan refers to the quantity of CSR disclosure; CSR Qual is the quality of CSR disclosure; BSZE is the total number 
of directors on the Board; INDTO is the number of independent directors on the Board of Directors; GOVWN is the percentage of shares owned by government; MANOW 
is the aggregate percentage of shares held by major shareholders (with at least 3% ownership); CEOD  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the Board is the 
same person as the CEO of the firm, otherwise it is 0; BMET is the total number of Board meetings during the year; ACSZE is the total number of directors on the audit 
committee; REMCOSZE is the number of members of the firm remuneration committee; LIQ is firm liquidity measured using the current ratio (current assets / current 
liabilities); LEV is firm leverage measured using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; DIVI is the total dividends paid to common shareholders; ASTGTH is firm 
asset growth ratio; CAPEXAST is capital expenditure assets measured as capital expenditures as a percentage of total assets. 
This table provides the Pearson correlation of CSR disclosure quantity and quality, in addition to explanatory variables.  
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5.3 Regression Results  
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of OLS regression analyses. Table 4 shows the results of the value relevance of CSR disclosure quantity 
(Model 1), while, Table 5 reports the results of the value relevance of CSR disclosure quality (Model 2). 
 The regression tables show that F-values of Model 1 are 5.997; 4.667 and 13.242 for Tobin’s Q model (TQ), return on assets (ROA) model 
and the market capitalisation (MC) model, respectively. F-values of Model 2 are 5.982; 4.672, and 10.883 for TQ; ROA and MC models, respectively. 
These values indicate that both Models 1 and 2 are statistically significant. Moreover, the adjusted R-Squared of Model 1 for the three measurements 
(TQ, ROA, MC) are 0.382, 312 and 0.602, respectively. Adjusted R-Squared of Model 2 are 0.381, 0.312 and 550, respectively for TQ, ROA and 
MC models.  
In terms of CSR disclosure, there is a significant positive association between CSR quantity and firm value proxied by market capitalization 
(MC) at a 1% level of significance. However, the CSR disclosure quantity is not statistically significant with Tobin’s Q ratio or ROA at any level of 
significance. Regarding CSR disclosure quality, there is a significant positive relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value measured by 
market capitalization (MC) at a 5% level of significance. On the other hand, there is no statistical significance with Tobin’s Q or ROA at any level of 
significance. Our analysis shows a positive association between CSR disclosure quality and quantity and market capitalization. However, we did not 
find the same results when we use either Tobin’s Q or Return on Assets (ROA) as proxies for firm value. This suggests that both CSR disclosure 
quantity and quality have the same impact on firm value. However, the significance of this impact depends on whether the authors use market 
capitalisation, Tobin’s Q or ROA. Therefore, it is not safe to accept H1 and H2.  
Prior research (e.g. Hassan et al. 2009) finds that voluntary disclosure has a positive but insignificant association with firm value. On the other 
hands, the result shows that the mandatory disclosure has a negative association with firm value and highly significant. Dybvig & Warachka (2015) 
argued that Tobin’s Q does not measure firm performance and it provides the two new measures for the firm value which are efficiency measure and 
assesses cost discipline. Consequently, this shortage of statistical significance supports the view that there is a conflicts relationship of determining 
the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value. In addition, there is no agreement in the literature about an ideal measure for firm value 
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(Mangena et al., 2012; Albassam, 2014). The finance theory suggestion that more public information increases firm value by reducing the firm’s cost 
of capital or increasing the cash follows that accrue to shareholders ((Botosan & Plumlee, 2002). Furthermore, firm value should be increasing as a 
result of disclosure quality through either reducing its cost of capital or increasing the cash flow to its shareholders or both (Elzahar et al, 2015). 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) found that firms that report non-financial social responsibility information are more likely to raise larger amounts of equity 
capital in the two years following the reporting, compared with non-reporting firms. From a signaling perspective, managers seeking finance 
assistance may wish to send good signals to the investors and debt holders. Looking at the control variables, we noted that the impact of firm 
characteristics and corporate governance on firm value is not the same in our models. This is because of the definition of our dependent value (firm 
value) and our independent variable (CSR quantity versus quality).  
 
Table 4: Regression result of CSR quantity  
 Tobin Q Return on assets (ROA) Market capitalization (MC) 
 Coefficient t- Statistics Sign Coefficient t- Statistics Sign Coefficient t- Statistics Sign 
Constant .745*** 3.265 .001 -4.889 -1.096 .275 11.540*** 22.361 .000 
CSR quan .002 .416 .678 .022 .286 .775 .045*** 4.942 .000 
BSZE -.028 -1.237 .218 1.083** 2.449 .015 .202*** 3.948 .000 
INDTOR -.018 -.848 .398 -.075 -.179 .858 -.098** -2.042 .043 
GOVWN .199 .621 .535 -15.744** -2.510 .013 1.999*** 2.756 .007 
MANOWR .467* 1.852 .066 6.038 1.224 .223 1.447** 2.536 .012 
CEOD .110 1.604 .111 2.934** 2.196 .030 .081 .526 .600 
BMET -.008 -.528 .599 .377 1.303 .194 .045 1.333 .184 
ACSZE -.028 -.611 .542 -.729 -.820 .414 .145 1.407 .161 
REMUCOSZE .075* 1.844 .067 1.071 1.351 .179 .048 .525 .601 
LIQ .062** 2.231 .027 1.484*** 2.751 .007 .041 .655 .513 
LEV -.003*** -4.437 .000 -.028** -2.370 .019 .001 .928 .355 
DIVI -.008 -.764 .446 -0.007* 1.732 .085 -0.007** 2.585 .011 
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ASTGTH -.001 -.366 .715 -.027 -.515 .607 .007 1.154 .250 
CAPEXAST .006 1.437 .153 .262*** 3.308 .001 .019** 2.020 .045 
Adjusted R-Squared .382 .312 .602 
F -test 
F  Sig.  
5.997*** 
.000 
4.667*** 
.000 
13.242*** 
.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.335 1.255 1.294 
Observation  171 171 171 
Firm value measured by TQ, ROA and MC; CSRQuan refers to the quantity of CSR disclosure; CSRQual is the quality of CSR disclosure; BSZE is the 
total number of directors on board; INDTO number of independent directors in the firm board of directors, GOVWN Percentage of shares owned by 
government, MANOW is the aggregate percentage of shares hold by major shareholders (with at least 3% ownership), CEOD  A dummy variable equals 
1 if the chairman is the same person as the CEO of the firm,0 otherwise  BMET is the total number of board meetings during the year; ACSZE is the is 
the total number of directors in audit committee;, , REMCOSZE Number of members of the  firm remuneration committee, LIQ is firm liquidity, measured 
using the current ratio (current assets / current liabilities); LEV is firm leverage, measured using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, DIVI Total 
dividends paid to common shareholders. ASTGTH is firm Assets growth ratio, CAPEXAST is capital expenditures assets, measured by Capital 
expenditures as percentage of total assets. 
***, **, * indicate significance at .001, .05 & .1 level. 
This table reports the Regression Results of the impact of CSR disclosure quantity of the firm value  
 
Table 5: Regression result of CSR quality  
 Tobin Q Return on assets (ROA) Market capitalization (MC) 
 Coefficient t- Statistics Sign Coefficient t- Statistics Sign Coefficient t- Statistics Sign 
Constant .759*** 3.187 .002 -4.255 -.915 .362 11.404*** 19.931 .000 
CSR qual -.019 -.079 .937 -1.838 -.386 .700 1.214** 2.075 .040 
BSZE -.025 -1.112 .268 1.161*** 2.666 .009 .249*** 4.657 .000 
INDTOR -.020 -.920 .359 -.132 -.312 .755 -.112** -2.155 .033 
GOVWN .181 .568 .571 -16.127** -2.586 .011 1.659** 2.162 .032 
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MANOWR .473* 1.824 .070 6.505 1.283 .201 1.182* 1.894 .060 
CEOD .111 1.626 .106 2.929** 2.194 .030 .151 .918 .360 
BMET -.007 -.482 .631 .384 1.337 .183 .067* 1.898 .060 
ACSZE -.023 -.520 .604 -.633 -.724 .470 .228** 2.119 .036 
REMUCOSZE .069* 1.768 .079 .959 1.252 .213 -.057 -.606 .545 
LIQ .060** 2.185 .030 1.451*** 2.700 .008 .015 .233 .816 
LEV -.003*** -4.456 .000 -.028** -2.417 .017 .001 .780 .436 
DIVI -.008 -.609 .543 .007** 1.985 .049 -.007*** 3.549 .001 
ASTGTH -.001 -.353 .725 -.026 -.495 .621 .007 1.141 .256 
CAPEXAST .005 1.332 .185 .251*** 3.165 .002 .013 1.363 .175 
Adjusted R Square .381 .312 .550 
F -test 
F  Sig.  
5.982*** 
.000 
4.672*** 
.000 
10.883*** 
.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.322 1.246 1.184 
Observation  171 171 171 
Firm value measured by TQ, ROA and MC; CSRQuan refers to the quantity of CSR disclosure; CSRQual is the quality of CSR disclosure; BSZE is 
the total number of directors on board; INDTO number of independent directors in the firm board of directors, GOVWN Percentage of shares owned by 
government, MANOW is the aggregate percentage of shares hold by major shareholders (with at least 3% ownership), CEOD  A dummy variable equals 
1 if the chairman is the same person as the CEO of the firm,0 otherwise  BMET is the total number of board meetings during the year; ACSZE is the is 
the total number of directors in audit committee;, , REMCOSZE Number of members of the  firm remuneration committee, LIQ is firm liquidity, 
measured using the current ratio (current assets / current liabilities); LEV is firm leverage, measured using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, DIVI 
Total dividends paid to common shareholders. ASTGTH is firm Assets growth ratio, CAPEXAST is capital expenditures assets, measured by Capital 
expenditures as percentage of total assets. 
***, **, * indicate significance at .001, .05 & .1 level. 
This table reports the Regression Results of the impact of CSR disclosure quantity of the firm value  
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6- CONCLUSION 
This study aims to examine the impact of quantity and quality of CSR disclosure on the 
value of a firm. It uses a sample of Saudi Arabian, non-financial listed firms over the period of 
2013-2014. It uses three measurements of firm value (Tobin’s Q, ROA and MC). The study 
finds that both CSR disclosure quantity and quality are significantly associated with the firm 
value measured by MC. However, both CSR disclosure quantity and quality are not 
significantly associated with TQ and ROA as proxies of firm value.  
This study offers important implications for the users of Annual Reports in Saudi 
Arabia and for companies as well. This study finds evidence that the disclosure of CSR could 
affect the value of firms. It is provides important implications for managers of Saudi firms by 
encourage and pay more attention to the CSR activities in the firm’s operations and highlights 
the importance of this type of disclosure to their firms.  
The study has some limitations that could be considered as avenues for future research. 
First, it focuses only on three measurements of firm value which are Tobin’s Q, return on assets 
and market capitalisation. It would be interesting to use other measures for firm value, such as 
scale efficiency measures, as suggested by Dybvig & Warachka (2015). Second, this study 
focuses on the CSR disclosure of non-financial firms only. It would be interesting to examine 
the association between CSR disclosure and firm value for financial companies. We finally 
suggest that further research could examine the economic consequences of CSR disclosure 
quantity versus quality by looking at the impact of disclosure on analysts’ forecasts; share price 
anticipation of earnings and the cost of capital.  
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Appendices: 
Appendix1: CSR disclosure quantity index   
1. Employee 5. Environmental Issues 
Employee Data Environmental policy statement 
Training &Development Designing facilities harmonious with environment 
Employees Benefit Using recycling material 
Pension Sponsoring environmental activities 
Work place pollution 
2. Community Waste management 
Community investment Conservation of natural resources 
Contribution to national economy 6. Energy 
Education Disclosing the company energy policies 
Health and safety Conservation of energy 
Social Loan Disclosing increased energy efficiency of products 
Social activities support 
7. Other Disclosures regarding to Saudi 
environment  
Funding scholarship programs 
Charitable society for the holy Quran memorization 
holly 
Human rights Ongoing charity ( WAGFF)  
Charity & Donation Hajj donations  
volunteering Others  disclosure related to Sharia activities 
Establish non-profit project  
3. Products and Services  
Developing & innovating new products  
Products & services quality  
ISO & other awards  
Guidance campaigns  
4. Customer  
Information of commercial and marketing  
Meeting customer needs   
customer feedback  
Customer service  
Customer satisfaction  
Existing of certificated systems of quality  
 
 
25 
 
Appendix 2: The index to measure of CSR disclosure quality adopted from Beest et al. 
(2009). 
Relevance 
Question no Question Likert’s  Literature 
R1 To what extent does the 
company disclosed the 
CSR in the annual 
report? 
1 =  No disclose about CSR 
2- Disclosed of CSR information 
limited (boilerplate paragraph). 
3 = Disclosed for Forward-looking 
information. 
4 = Apart subsection of CSR. 
5 = Extensive information useful for 
making expectation. 
e.g. McDaniel et al., 
2002; Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000 
Chakroun et al. 
2013; Beest et 
al.2009.  
 
R2 To what extent does the 
presence of non-financial 
company in terms of 
business opportunities 
and to what extent 
contribute to the society 
and environment? 
1 = No non-financial information 
2 = Little non-financial information, 
no useful for forming expectations 
3 = Useful non-financial information 
4 = Useful financial information, 
helpful for developing expectations 
5 = Non-financial information 
presents additional information 
which helps developing expectations 
e.g. Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000 
Chakroun et al. 
2013; Beest et 
al.2009. 
 
Faithful representation 
F1 To what extent does the 
company, in the 
discussion of CSR in the 
annual report, highlight 
the positive events as 
well as the negative 
events? 
1 =  No positive & negative events, 
are mentioned 
2 = Negative events only mentioned 
in footnotes 
3 = Emphasize on positive events 
4 = Balance positive/negative events 
of CSR 
5 = Impact of positive/negative 
events of CSR is also explained  
  
e.g. IASB (2008). 
Cohen et al., 2004 
Chakroun et al. 
2013 ; Beest et 
al.2009. 
 
F2 To what extent does the 
company provide more 
explain of CSR 
information? 
1 = No description of CSR 
2 = Information on CSR limited,  
3 = Apart subsection of CSR 
4 = Extra attention paid to 
information concerning CSR 
5 = Comprehensive description of 
CSR 
e.g. Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000; 
Beest et al.2009. 
 
Understandability 
U1 To what extent is the 1 = Very bad presentation ( no text of e.g. Jonas and 
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annual report presented 
of CSR in a well-
organized manner? 
CSR)                                   
2 = Bad presentation ( text only)                                         
3 = Poor presentation  (text and  
graphs )                                              
4 = Good presentation ( text,  graphs 
and ratio ) 
5 = Very good presentation ( full 
paragraph with more descriptive ) 
Blanchet, 2000 
Chakroun et al. 
2013; Beest et 
al.2009.  
 
U2 To what extent does the 
presence of graphs and 
tables clarifies the 
presented information of 
CSR? 
1 = No graphs 
2 = 1-5 graphs 
3 = 6-10 graphs 
4 = 11-15 graphs 
5 = > 15 
e.g. Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000 
Comparability 
C1 To what extent is the 
information of CSR in 
the annual report 
comparable to 
information provided by 
other organizations? 
1 = No comparability ( no paragraph)  
2 = Limited comparability ( one 
paragraph) 
3 = Moderate comparability  (two  
paragraph)                            
4 = Very much comparability  (two  
paragraph with numbering)       
5 = Very extensive comparability ( 
more than above )                                                            
e.g. Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000. 
Chakroun et al. 
2013, Beest et 
al.2009 
 
C2 To what extent does the 
company presents 
financial index numbers 
of CSR and ratios in the 
annual report? 
1 = No ratios 
2 = 1-2 ratios 
3 = 3-5 ratios 
4 = 6-10 ratios 
5 = > 10 ratios 
(e.g. Cleary, 1999; 
Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000. Chakroun et 
al. 2013, Beest et 
al.2009 
 
